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applied the same deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review to
Pioneer's decisions to deny projects on, and remove projects from, its property.
Notably, the Court rejected the district court's ruling that irrigation entities
retain an exclusive interest in their easements and rights-of-way. The Court
reasoned that Idaho common law provides for community and individual use
and enjoyment of an irrigation district's property so long as such use does not
unreasonably interfere with the irrigation district's purpose. The Court held no
other Idaho statutes on point indicated the legislature wished to abrogate this
right.
Accordingly, the Court held that a deferential arbitrary and capricious review of Pioneer's decisions was appropriate. The Court also affirmed the district court's ruling authorizing Pioneer to provide or withhold permission for
the construction of the City's drainage system on Pioneer's property, and to
remove those pipes Pioneer believed interfered with its own system.
The concurring justices disagreed that Idaho law mandated such deferential review of Pioneer's decisions. The concurrence argued that applying limited review to a party's decisions simply because the party had acted in a quasimunicipal capacity would improperly extend limited review to an indefinite
number of non-government parties. The concurrence argued the Court should
instead review an irrigation entity's decisions over encroachments on its easements and rights-of-way by determining whether the trespass was unreasonable
or materially interfered with the irrigation district's system. Under this approach, irrigation districts could challenge potentially unreasonable encroachments but not unilaterally remove systems that were rightfully in place. For
these reasons, the concurrence also argued irrigation districts should not be
permitted to remove encroachments prior to receiving a judicial order finding
the encroachment unreasonable.
Lauren Varner
* Editor's Note: As of the date of publication, the opinion summarized above
has been withdrawn and superseded by Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell,
288 P.3d 810 (Idaho 2012). Please see Volume 16, Issue 2 of the Water Law
Reviewfor a summary of the amended opinion.

MONTANA
Fellows v. Office of Water Comm'r, 285 P.3d 448 (Mont 2012) (holding
a Montana district court lacked authority to adjudicate water rights but a water
right holder's factual allegations related to hydrologic connectivity between two
water courses and its request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient grounds
upon which the water right holder could invoke the district court's declaratory
judgment power).
In 1908, the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court adjudicated the water rights on the upper portion of the Teton River and appointed a water
comnissioner to administer the decreed rights. Fifty to sixty years later, the
water commissioner began to divert the entire flow of the upper Teton River
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through the Bateman Ditch diversion around the Springhill Reach, a portion
of the river that lost a significant amount of water to seepage. The water commissioner implemented this diversion through the Bateman ditch without the
approval of the Eleventh Judicial District Court and without any other agreement between the affected parties.
Charles Fellows ("Fellows") owns a water right in Spring Creek near
Choteau, Montana, which was adjudicated and decreed in 1892. In February
2011, Fellows filed a complaint in the District Court, Ninth Judicial District,
Teton ("district court"), pursuant to section 85-5-301(1) of the Montana Code,
which pernuits the holder of a vested water right who is dissatisfied with a water
commissioners' method of distribution to file a complaint with the district
court. Fellows alleged the water comImissioner's diversion of the upper Teton
River through the Bateman Ditch around the Springhill Reach substantially
injured his senior water right in Spring Creek. Fellows asked the district court
to grant declaratory relief until the state's water court settled all the water rights
between the upper Teton River and Spring Creek.
The district court determined whether Fellows had standing to bring a
complaint against the water commissioner of the upper Teton River under
section 85-5-301(1) depended on his ability to prove the upper Teton River's
hydrological connection with Spring Creek through the Springhill Reach. The
district court dismissed Fellows' complaint, finding he must first establish his
standing, against the water commissioner by resolving the connectivity issue
with the state's water court.
Instead, Fellows appealed to the Montana Supreme Court. The Court reversed the district court, holding the district court was the proper venue for the
determination of the connectivity issue and the complaint against the upper
Teton River water commissioner. In examining the claim against the water
commissioner, the Court held that because Fellows' right was not derived from
any rights on the Teton River, he had no statutory claim against the water
commissioner.
Second, the Court examined Fellows' connectivity claim. The Court held
that while the water court has exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of
existing water rights, the district court has jurisdiction over the distribution of
decreed water rights. Therefore, the Court held the district court was the
proper venue for both the connectivity issue and the complaint against the
water commissioner because the water court had already decreed the rights in
Spring Creek and the upper Teton River.
Therefore, viewing Fellows' allegations of the hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the upper Teton River, and the allegations against the
water commissioner in a light most favorable to Fellows, the Court held the
district court erred in dismissing Fellows' complaint.
The Court reversed the district court's order of sumnary judgment against
Fellows and remanded the issue of the connectivity between Spring Creek and
the upper Teton River to the district court.
Jacob A. Watterson

